A Nation-state without the nation? The trajectories of nation-formation in Montenegro by Malesevic, Sinisa & Uzelac, Gordana
A Nation-state without the nation?
The trajectories of nation-formation
in Montenegro1
SINISˇA MALESˇEVIC´n and GORDANA UZELACnn
nDepartment of Political Science and Sociology, National University
of Ireland, Galway
nnDepartment of Sociology, London Metropolitan University, UK
ABSTRACT. Following the successful referendum of May 2006, Montenegro became
the last of the former Yugoslav republics to opt for an independent state. Only ﬁfteen
years earlier, when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed, Montene-
gro was resolute to continue the Yugoslav state-formation in a union with Serbia. This
paper attempts to answer the following questions: Why did it take so much longer for
the Montenegrin population to follow the experience of other republics in its decision
on independence? How can one explain a staggering change in public opinion on
questions of national self-determination over such a short time-span? And, ﬁnally,
what are the dominant discourses of ‘‘Montenegrin-ness’’? The authors argue that the
answers to these questions are to be found in the particularities of Montenegro’s
historical development, and especially in the structural legacies of state socialism. The
consequence of these developments was the formation of two separate Montenegrin
national ideologies: one which sees Montenegrins as ethnically Serb, and the other that
deﬁnes Montenegrins in civic terms. The paper concludes that these two divergent
trajectories of nation-formation in Montenegro are largely the unintended conse-
quence of intensive state-building, cultural and political modernisation and, most of
all, the gradual politicisation and institutionalisation of high culture.
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Introduction
The collapse of communism as a social, political and economic order in the
early 1990s was paralleled by the collapse of the state socialist model of
federalism. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Ethiopia all
disintegrated along federal lines as their former federal units became inde-
pendent states. The only exception to this rule was the tiny South-east
European state of Montenegro, which in 1992 held a referendum on its
independence in which more than ninety per cent of its people decided to
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remain in the federal union with Serbia. It took another fourteen years to
organise a second referendum in which the majority were in favour of
independence, thus making Montenegro the last of the former state socialist
federal units to become a sovereign, internationally recognised state. The
three central and interrelated questions raised by this paper are: Why did it
take much longer for the Montenegrin population to opt for independence
than for the populations of other former communist states? How can one
explain such a staggering change in public opinion on questions of national
self-determination over what is, historically speaking, a very short period of
time? And ﬁnally, what are the dominant discourses of ‘Montenegrin-ness’?
In order to answer these three questions, we must explore a variety of social
factors which could potentially have inﬂuenced this outcome. Our analysis
recognises the importance of economic, political, cultural and historical
variables in accounting for the direction of the nation-formation process in
Montenegro. However, we argue that the most signiﬁcant factors are to be
found in the peculiar interplay between culture and politics; that is, in the
politicisation and institutionalisation of culture that occurred under state
socialism. In other words, we argue that it was under communist modernity
that the institutional and organisational tracks which helped to structurally
articulate the two competing forms of nation-building in Montenegro – the
Serbian and the Montenegrin – were established. While the structures of state
socialism provided the institutional framework for the crystallisation of this
dual ethno-national diversity, it was recent geopolitical changes that coloured
the content of the two nationalisms and that put the ﬁnal nail in the cofﬁn of
the joint Serbian and Montenegrin state.
The paper is divided into four parts. First, we look brieﬂy at the
explanatory power of different social factors related to the question of the
belated call for independence. Second, we concisely outline the historical
trajectories of nation- and state-building in Montenegro from the late eight-
eenth century until the end of World War II. Third, we focus on the
communist period and the role of state socialist modernity in shaping the
ethno-political space. Finally, we direct our attention to current debates in
the Montenegrin media on the question of ‘Who are the Montenegrins?’ in
order to identify the form and content of the dominant discursive frames of
nationhood in Montenegro today.
The peculiarities of Montenegro’s delayed independence
As with any socio-historical phenomenon, the deferred2 popular call for
Montenegrin independence is a result of a variety of social factors: historical
legacies and internal political and geographical divides, ﬁnancial dependence
on the federal state and the economic debacle of the mid-1980s, the skewed
and ambiguous relationship with Serbia, the complex military and heroic
tradition of the Montenegrin tribes, the lack of substantial non-communist
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alternatives during the early years of transition, and the peculiarity of
Montenegro’s geopolitical position. While all of these and many other factors
had a signiﬁcant impact on the trajectory of social development in Montene-
gro, it is our contention that the most decisive explanation is to be found in
the interplay between political and cultural factors. Speciﬁcally, we focus
on the role of the communist state in fostering the processes that have
intensiﬁed the institutionalisation and eventual politicisation of culture. How-
ever, before we articulate our argument it is important to evaluate the strengths
and weaknesses of individual economic, cultural and political explanations.
Economic explanations stress the importance of objective, material con-
siderations that precluded early calls for independence: the small size of the
country (13,812 km2 with little over 600,000 inhabitants) and the alleged
economic non-viability of an independent state that possessed few natural
resources and had a chronic shortage of water (Gallagher 2003: 62). In
addition, Montenegro’s geographically landlocked situation between such
impoverished countries as Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo further contrib-
uted to its weak, static and underdeveloped economy. The Yugoslav wars of
the 1990s devastated an already weak ﬁnancial system, cutting real GDP and
industrial output to half of what it had been in 1990 (Ðuric´ 2003: 141).
Although economic factors do matter, they are clearly insufﬁcient in account-
ing for the gradual change in popular attitudes towards independence. The
Montenegrin economic system remains in worse shape than it had been in
1990, and has only slightly improved since 1992, but the change in popular
attitudes towards independence over this same period has been astonishing:
while in 1992 almost ninety-six per cent of population (with a turnout of sixty-
six per cent) were in favour of union with Serbia, in the referendum of 2006
the population was ﬁrmly split in two with a slight majority in favour of
independence. Economic motives alone cannot explain such an unprecedented
change in social attitudes.
As even some Montenegrin economists recognise (i.e. Ðuric´ 2003: 157),
political factors seem to be more signiﬁcant since the economic system often
‘functioned as the hostage of politics’. The overtly political interpretations of
the delayed calls for independence appear more solid. The early removal of
the ‘indigenous’ Montenegrin communist leadership in favour of a pro-
Serbian faction in January 1989, underpinned by the perception of a
neighbouring external ‘threat’ in Kosovo and coupled with an extreme
polarisation of politics along the East versus West axis in socialist Yugoslavia,
had powerful adverse effects on the development of Montenegrin nationalism.
The clear lack of articulated non-communist alternatives,3 the traditionally
strong support for the Yugoslav military (where Montenegrin ofﬁcers were
highly overrepresented) and the speciﬁc geopolitical position of Montenegro
meant that the wars of Yugoslav succession further helped unite the popula-
tion of Montenegro around the new pro-Serbian leadership. A strong military
presence, including the relocation of the entire Yugoslav navy ﬂeet to the tiny
Montenegrin coastal ports and the involvement of Montenegrin army
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reservists in the temporary occupation of Croatian territory around Dubrov-
nik, also strengthened Montenegro’s traditional links with Serbia. All of these
political events help us to understand how and why indigenous Montenegrin
nationalism was institutionally stiﬂed, but do not explain the peculiar
direction that the nation-building process took in the late 1990s. Political
factors alone cannot account for the hard and uncompromising schism
between Montenegrin and Serbian nationalism today.
Finally, cultural factors have been identiﬁed as crucial to understanding the
traditional weakness of a distinct Montenegrin nationalism. The fact that
most Montenegrins nominally belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church, that
the majority refer to their mother tongue as Serbian and write in Cyrillic
script, and that they share many of what Anthony Smith (1999) would call
common ethno-historical myths and memories (such as, for example, ‘the
Ottoman Yoke’) suggests that the cultural and historical similarity between
Montenegrins and Serbs has been the most inﬂuential social impediment to
the development of an articulated and potent Montenegrin ideology of
national self-determination. Although this perceived cultural similarity is
fundamental to understanding the late calls for political independence, this
has little if anything to do with any actual similarity between the two groups
and more to do with the speciﬁc historical and institutional context that set
the processes of politicisation of culture in motion. In other words, since any
trans-historical cultural similarity of large collectivities is more mythical than
real, and since cultures are dynamic processes rather than static categories,
this alleged Serbian and Montenegrin similarity is highly problematic for a
number of reasons.
First of all, as will be elaborated later, the collective designations of Serb,
Montenegrin, Christian, Orthodox4 or speciﬁc tribal or clan-based names (i.e.
Bjelopavlovic´i, Piperi, Kucˇi) were historically highly ambiguous, and rarely if
ever mutually exclusive categories of identiﬁcation. The fact that a particular
nineteenth- or early twentieth-century peasant from the tribe of Bjelopavlo-
vic´s would describe herself as Serb (or Montenegrin or Christian) would not
necessitate that she show any actual cultural resemblance or sense of
attachment to a peasant in Serbia. On the contrary, she would probably
resemble and identify more with an Albanian-speaking peasant from her own
clan or tribe. Even if there was a nascent sense of Serbian/Montenegrin
identiﬁcation this does not mean that the actual cultural similarities existed on
the ground as group loyalties remained predominantly articulated in a micro/
local (i.e. tribal or clan-based) rather than macro/national sense. While the
(external) rhetoric of nationhood was occasionally present, it played little if
any role in the actual everyday life of the peasantry.
Second, the actual cultural similarity argument ignores the signiﬁcant
difference between the North (Brda) and other regions incorporated only after
the First Balkan War and the rest of Montenegro (Old Montenegro). As we
will demonstrate, this socio-geographical divide between the two regions has
never been fully transcended. Third, the emphasis on shared religion as a
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principal source of common identity between the two groups is problematic in
both historical and current terms. As Pavlovic´ (2003b: 142) and long before
him Rovinski (1998[1897]) show, church attendance was quite low and
religious practice was at as non-observant a level in nineteenth-century
Montenegro as it is in Montenegro today. Current Montenegrin society is
predominantly secular, and the two leading political parties of the post-
communist era, the pro-Montenegrin PDS and the pro-Serb SNP, are both
offshoots of the former Montenegrin League of Communists. Finally, hard
cultural arguments, as with purely economic or political arguments, cannot
explain the sudden outburst of Montenegrin nationalism since the late 1990s.
To understand this development one must engage not with the static notion of
trans-historical cultural unity but with the institutional, historical and socio-
logical processes that initiated the politicisation of culture during the state
socialist period. In other words, it is not culture or politics per se that matter;
it is the peculiar interaction between the two that can explain the unusual
social character of Montenegrin nation-formation. To fully comprehend the
complexity of this process of nation-building, a brief overview of Montene-
gro’s social history is required.
A brief social history of Montenegro
As the story goes, in 1766 a stranger came to the town of Maine. A year after
his arrival he would become known as Sˇc´epan Mali (Stephen the Little),
the ﬁrst and only ‘Tsar’ of Montenegro. The only ‘credential’ that put him on
the throne and secured him the love of and authority over the common people
and their leaders was a rumour that he was actually the Russian Tsar Peter the
Third. In the seven years of his rule, Montenegrin tribes achieved a level of
unity and peace that had never existed before (Jovanovic´ 1948: 134–50). This
rather extraordinary event points towards important circumstances in the
formation of Montenegrin society. It illustrates the complicated geopolitical
position of Montenegrin lands, the complex social, political and economic
structure of Montenegro and, above all, the rich history that would be
appropriated as national history several centuries later.
The history of Montenegrin lands was to a great extent shaped by their
distinctive geopolitical position. Historical records testify to the formation of
Zeta as the ﬁrst organised political entity in these territories. Zeta was short-
lived and after 173 years of independent existence, in 1189 it became a semi-
autonomous section of a state ruled by the Nemanjic´ dynasty. The collapse of
the Nemanjic´ dynasty in 1360 opened the door to the advance of a new power
in the Balkans: the Ottomans. Over the next four centuries, Montenegrin
history was marked by its position between the Ottomans and Venice. The
Ottomans never gained full control over the lands of Montenegro. They
managed to establish control over the main cities but found themselves
incapable of maintaining a grip on the mountainous villages where the
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Orthodox population found refuge. This situation facilitated the formation of
a speciﬁc social structure and culture for the people that lived in these
territories.
Boehm (1983) has deﬁned Montenegro as a segmentary society. The basic
unit of Montenegrin society was the kuc´a (the house), a patrilocal extended
family or a type of zadruga. Houses of unilinear descent usually formed a
bratstvo (a clan, literally a brotherhood) over a relatively homogeneous
territory with a strong sense of solidarity and group identity. Each bratstvo
belonged to a pleme (tribe). Historical records refer to about twenty-one tribes
of so-called Old Montenegro, and seven tribes of the Brda area (Rastoder
2003: 113).5 Inter-tribal issues were discussed in the All-Montenegrin Assem-
bly. However, decisions of this assembly had only a moral obligation for the
tribes as it possessed no executive organs. The Assembly elected and was
chaired by the Vladika (the Metropolitan of the Montenegrin Orthodox
Church). The Vladika served as both religious and secular leader of the
Montenegrin tribes. This formally theocratic government lasted until 1852
when the Vladika Danilo proclaimed himself Prince and assumed a strictly
secular role. At this time, Boehm (1983: 64) concludes, ‘the identity and self-
interest of (the) individual Montenegrin was tied much more closely to his
tribe, and to its jealously guarded autonomy, than to any idea of Montenegro
as a whole’.
The episode of Sˇc´epan Mali at the end of the eighteenth century marked a
new beginning. The successive Vladikas – Petar I and Petar II Petrovic´ Njegosˇ –
were determined to secure the internal unity of both Old Montenegro and
the Brda tribes. In 1798 the Assembly devised the General Montenegrin and
Hill Code to provide a legal basis, enforced by theMontenegrin and Hill Court
and National Chancellery that resided in the capital, Cetinje (Rastoder 2003:
118). The ﬁrst taxation system was established in 1833, backed by the
institution of the (ﬁrst) central police. A year later the ﬁrst primary school
and a monthly magazine in Montenegro were established. In 1852, Petar II’s
nephew Danilo formally separated secular from religious authority and
established Montenegro as a principality. In 1853 he formed the ﬁrst
Montenegrin army and two years later issued the so-called Danilo’s Legal
Code.
Montenegro was formally recognised as an independent state at the
Congress of Berlin in 1878. Prince Nikola concentrated on further consolida-
tion of the central government, and in 1905 introduced the ﬁrst Montenegrin
constitution. The state was deﬁned as a constitutional monarchy, and soon
Montenegro witnessed the formation of its ﬁrst political parties: Narodna
stranka (the People’s Party, better known as Klubasˇka, the Club Party) and
Prava narodna stranka (the Real People’s Party, better known as Pravasˇi).
While the latter formed around support for the Montenegrin court, the former
propagated closer ties with Serbia and Serbs. The opposition between these
two parties was further radicalised after 1910 when Prince Nikola proclaimed
Montenegro a Kingdom.
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The most important consequence of the 1912–13 Balkan Wars was a
signiﬁcant expansion of Montenegrin territory. In the wake of World War I,
Montenegro acquired territories that had never before been a part of
Montenegro, and a population with divided loyalties. After a few initial
successes, Austria-Hungary occupied Montenegro in late 1915. The King and
his government left the country and the Montenegrin Army ofﬁcially
surrendered. It was the Serbian Army that ofﬁcially liberated and therefore
effectively controlled Montenegro in 1918. The end of the war marked the
beginning of the formation of a uniﬁed South Slav state. When this new state
incorporated the territories of Montenegro, Montenegro ceased to exist as a
political entity. An election for the so-called Grand National Assembly was
organised, and on 26 November 1918 this parliament dethroned its king and
accepted unconditional uniﬁcation with the Kingdom of Serbia.
The division of loyalties between political and cultural elites in Montenegro
was from now on to be recognised ‘in colour’, based on the colour of the paper
on which the lists of candidates for the Assembly was printed. The supporters
of uniﬁcation were known as Bjelasˇi (Whites) and opponents as Zelenasˇi
(Greens). While the Bjelasˇi claimed that Serbs and Montenegrins were one
people, and as such belonged to one country, the Zelenasˇi advocated the
principle of equality whereby Montenegro should have retained a separate
identity. Pavlovic´ (2003a) argues that the majority of Zelenasˇi supporters
came from so-called Old Montenegro, while the supporters of uniﬁcation were
predominantly from the territories of the Brda and those acquired after the
Balkan Wars. The Kingdom of SHS (from 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia)
enforced assimilationist policies. It viewed Montenegrins as ethnic Serbs and
Montenegro as the guardian of Serbian statehood throughout the period of
Ottoman rule.
Yet the division between the population of Montenegro, particularly its
political and cultural elites, did not vanish. The same territorial and
ideological divisions drove the people of Montenegro into opposing camps
during the Italian occupation of 1941. The supporters of an independent
Montenegro, the Zelenasˇi, soon joined the communist Partisans, while the
Bjelasˇi supported Serbian nationalist forces (Chetniks). By 1945 the Chetniks
were defeated and the newly established socialist state introduced the policy of
‘brotherhood and unity’ between all Yugoslav nations. The Federal People’s
Republic of Yugoslavia, constituted in 1945, had six federal units, and
Montenegro was one of them.
State socialism and nationalism
Most analysts explain the origins of the ethno-political divide in Montenegro
either by focusing on ‘ancient’ history, tracing back the present discord to the
seventeenth, eighteenth or even the eleventh century, or alternatively by
concentrating solely on the most recent political changes accompanying the
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collapse of communism and wars of Yugoslav succession. Despite their
disagreements on the causes of this divide, these accounts regularly ignore
or explicitly dismiss the post-World War II period of state socialism as largely
irrelevant toward understanding the nature of this divide. The same can be
said of many general accounts of communism (Vulliamy 1994; Kaplan 1993),
in which the argument holds that the authoritarian state successfully sup-
pressed the politicisation of cultural difference whereby both Serbian and
Montenegrin nationalisms were ‘frozen’ in time and could not develop as they
were supposedly held in check by the iron ﬁst of the communist rulers.6
It is our contention that, in fact, the opposite was the case: that in order to
fully understand and explain the emergence of competing popular national-
isms in Montenegro, one must analytically dissect the structure and workings
of the communist state itself. Following in part Gellner (1964, 1983) and
Brubaker (1996),7 we argue that despite its political invisibility, it was the
communist state, more than any of its pre-modern predecessors, that created
the institutional tracks and unwittingly laid the foundations for the emergence
of both the fully ﬂedged popular nationalist doctrines of Montenegrinhood
and Serbdom, as well as the structural contours for the eventual independence
of Montenegro. We do not argue that the two nationalisms were exclusively
created by state socialism. Obviously, as elite articulated phenomena – evident
from our short historical analysis – they were in existence long before the
establishment of the communist state. Our argument focuses on the institu-
tional underpinnings of nationalism as a mass phenomenon.
As many scholars of nationalism (Gellner 1964, 1983; Smith 1979; Mann
1993; Anderson 1983) have convincingly demonstrated, the development and
ultimate success of a particular nationalist movement requires modernity:
standardisation of vernacular languages, high literacy rates, advanced divi-
sion of labour, articulated ‘high’ culture, developed infrastructural powers of
the state, a substantial degree of state centralisation, universal conscription,
mass-scale education, constitutionalism, developed transport and communi-
cation systems and some form of ‘print-capitalism’. As already indicated,
before 1945 Montenegro was lacking in most of these. Although Vuk
Karadzˇic´ had successfully standardised the Serbo-Croat language in the early
nineteenth century, a majority of the Montenegrin population (56.1 per cent)
was still illiterate in 1941, with over eighty per cent living in highly under-
developed rural areas (SGCG 1991). Before the communist revolution,
Montenegro was still a staunchly tribal society with almost no industry, few
major roads, only one small railroad and little division of labour. As we have
seen, the ﬁrst primary school was established as late as 1834 (Rastoder 2003:
120) and by 1945 there were only a handful of secondary schools with no
higher education or any equivalent institutionalised ‘high’ culture. Although
some form of military draft was introduced by Prince Danilo in 1853 with the
Cross-bearers army (Krstonosna vojska) and army ranks were established by
Prince Nikola in 1870 (Rastoder 2003: 121–2), this was a far cry from a
modern, mass-scale professional army. Montenegro had no constitutional
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order or parliament until 1905. Finally, as literacy rates were very low, the
ﬁrst Montenegrin newspaper, Crnogorac (Montenegrin), appeared only in
1871, so that by the early 1940s there were too few daily publications and
too few regular readers to meet one of Anderson’s (1983) basic requirements
for the existence of an articulated, mass-scale, nationalist ideology: print-
capitalism. Hence pre-communist Montenegro was a traditionalist, agrarian
society and as Gellner (1983) makes clear, illiterate peasants do not make
good nationalists. Although obviously there were individual nationalist
ideologues (such as Jovan Plamenac) and small elite-based Serbian and
Montenegrin nationalist circles, pre-communist Montenegro met no elemen-
tary structural conditions for the development of nationalist movements in
the sociological sense of the word. As Pavlovic´ (2003b: 86) rightly points out
when writing about eighteenth-century Montenegro, ‘it was the tribe and not
the state/central authority that nearly exclusively provided the mechanisms of
horizontal identiﬁcation for individuals’. In addition to strong tribal attach-
ments and intense regional divides, a much more powerful source of collective
solidarity in pre-modern Montenegro was the religious tradition of Eastern
Orthodoxy.8 On top of that, the ﬁrst attempts at the politicisation of
Montenegrin culture had been interrupted by the 1918 uniﬁcation.
Hence the communist revolution was a key catalyst for the nationalisation
of the masses in two senses: as a structural agent of intensive modernisation
and as a generator for the politicisation of culture. From 1945 to 1991
Montenegro was transformed dramatically from a network of rural, agrarian,
illiterate and kinship-based clans into a moderately developed, urbanised
society with almost universal literacy (over ninety-ﬁve per cent) and a vibrant
‘high’ culture. The machinery of the modern bureaucratic state, together with
an elaborate administrative apparatus, was put in place for the ﬁrst time. The
processes of industrialisation and urbanisation intensiﬁed to such a degree
that by 2003, sixty-two per cent of the population were residing in the urban
centres (Jelic´ 2005: 68), with the great majority working either in industry or
service. The industrial sector grew from six per cent in 1945 to thirty-ﬁve per
cent in 1990 (Rastoder 2003: 137). The infrastructural network of roads,
railways and airports was built to sustain an ever-increasing level of travel and
communication within the state, the pinnacles of which were the Jadranska
magistrala of 1961 (linking the mountainous north and the coastal south) and
the Belgrade-Bar railway (1976).
Even more signiﬁcant was the cultural milieu of the new communist
republic in which the true foundations for the nationalisation of the masses
were laid – the cultural and educational infrastructure. It was under commu-
nist rule that all major Montenegrin cultural and educational institutions were
created: the ﬁrst college (1947), the ﬁrst university faculty (of economics in
1960), the ﬁrst full-ﬂedged university (in 1974), the Institute of History (1948),
the State Archive (1951), the National Theatre (1953) and the Montenegrin
Academy of Arts and Sciences (1973) (Rastoder 2003: 137). This period was
also witness to a dramatic expansion in mass media: while there had been only
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one radio station broadcast and four newspapers published in 1947, by 2003
there were thirty-two newspapers, thirty-one radio stations, and thirteen TV
stations (SP 1985: 217, SG CG 2004: 187–9). Thus the communist era was the
most important period of modernisation for Montenegrin society, creating
indispensable conditions for the potential transformation of ‘peasants into
Montenegrins’. But while the conditions were ripe, the trajectories that the
nation-formation processes took in Montenegro were different from those
envisaged by Gellner (1983, 1997) or Brubaker (1996). Instead of a single path
to nationhood, the modernisation processes created two competing forms of
nation-ness – Montenegrin and Serb. Why this particular outcome? To
answer this question, we must address the second issue: the state-induced
politicisation of culture.
Although an integral part of the Yugoslav federation, Montenegro had its
own constitution (since 1946) and, as with other Yugoslav republics, a
considerable degree of political autonomy. Due to the gradual decentralisa-
tion of power from the federal centre to individual republics, which culmi-
nated in the adoption of the 1974 semi-confederal Yugoslav constitution, the
state’s constitutional independence only increased.9 So by the late 1980s, the
state elite had full control over the economy, ﬁnances, education, media,
policing, jurisprudence, social services and even civil defence. As with other
Yugoslav republics, Montenegro was a state within a state, pursuing its own
geopolitical goals and socio-economic policies. What made it different from
the other republics, and what was decisive to its delayed calls for full
independence, are two sets of events both of which were rooted in its state
socialist past.
First, to avoid any traditional political divides, the communist state
nominally kept the ethno-national categories of Serb and Montenegrin as
ambiguous as possible, papering them over with a supposedly trans-national
Yugoslavism.10 Although the existence of Montenegrin statehood was not
questioned, the idea of Montenegrin nationhood remained vague and unclear
and this was fully reﬂected in Montenegro’s institutions of high culture
whereby some organisations such as the Academy of Arts and Sciences
were politically more Serbophile, while others such as the Association of
Montenegrin Writers, or Pen Club, were more Montenegrin. However, much
more important was the fact that this institutional ambiguity was founded on
the principle of not opposing the categories of Serb and Monetengrin, and
keeping the three forms (including Yugoslav) of collective attachments deeply
inclusive of one another. As a result, a majority of the population went along
with this elusive understanding of Montenegrin-ness, whereby for some being
Montenegrin implied a distinct sense of nationhood while for others it was no
more than a regional designation. The fact that all state censuses indicated
that an overwhelming majority declared themselves Montenegrin (in 1961
81.3 per cent, in 1981 68.65 per cent and in 1991 61.86 per cent) while only a
very small minority saw themselves as Serbs (in 1961 3 per cent, in 1981 3.32
per cent and in 1991 9.34 per cent) (SG CG 2004; Woodward 1995)11 is less of
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a reliable indicator of the intensity of national identiﬁcation and more a blase´
symptom of this institutionalised ambiguity. In other words, as long as the
notions of Serbian-ness and Montenegrin-ness were not in any direct conﬂict,
declaring oneself vaguely as Montenegrin did not necessarily imply that one
was not also a Serb. The main reason behind this state-sponsored ambiguity
was the intention to transcend all historical political splits within Montenegro.
Most of these historical cleavages converged on the same axis of polarisa-
tion, often including members of the same family or ‘tribe’ (Greens versus
Whites, secular versus orthodox, North versus South, Russophiles versus
Westernisers, traditionalists versus modernisers), and culminating in ﬁerce
ideological clashes between those who supported Tito or Stalin in their 1948
break-up.12 Before communist modernity, the designations ‘Serb’ or ‘Mon-
tenegrin’ had little meaning in terms of diverse cultural content, as the major
historical cleavages were purely political. However, the fact that so many
political divides congregated around the two distinct groupings created a
structural condition, underpinned by the modernising and hence nationalising
state, whereby political divides gradually acquired culturally diverse content.
In other words, despite its normative commitment to internationalism and the
Yugoslav transnationalism of ‘brotherhood and unity’, the state’s organisa-
tional structure unwittingly provided for the gradual institutionalisation and
crystallisation of political cleavages into future ethno-national divides. And
this leads us to the second set of events: the replacement of the nationalising
Montenegrin state elite with Milosˇevic´–installed, pro-Serbian cadres in 1989.
It is these events more than anything else that temporarily derailed the process
of nationalisation of the masses in the direction of Montenegrin nationhood.
Utilising popular dissatisfaction with the existing leadership and the
profound economic crisis of the 1980s that almost paralysed the Montenegrin
economy – with unemployment rising to twenty-four per cent (Woodward
1995: 33; Bieber 2003) – the new Milosˇevic´-supported cadres were installed in
power. Organising mass demonstrations of workers, this new political elite
managed to successfully channel popular social discontent into Serbophile
ethno-nationalism, whereby demonstrators ‘came as workers and went home
as Serbs’ (Ðukic´ 1994: 109). This so-called ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ was
the ﬁrst articulated and sustained attempt to employ the already established
and institutionalised structural mechanisms in order to politicise culture
and to initiate ethno-nationalist mobilisation of the masses. Drawing on the
traditional cultural/religious similarity with Serbia, which was now enhanced
by the Kosovo conﬂict (depicting Albanian rebellion and Slovenian sympathy
with it in ethno-cultural rather than political terms), the new rulers were in a
position to radically politicise ethno-culture. Initially, with the strong pre-
sence of the culturally distinct Other, this movement maintained much of the
previous Serb-Montenegrin-Yugoslav ambiguity. Even though, with the wars
in Croatia and Bosnia, ‘the Other’ gradually shifted from Kosovo Albanians
and Slovenes to the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, so long as its presence
was maintained the Montenegrin alliance with Serbia remained solid. In other
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words, the institutionally created conditions for ethno-mobilisation were in
place and the geopolitical environment shaped the content of this process.
However, once this external ‘threat’ was removed and geopolitical condi-
tions changed, the movement, together with its main individual protago-
nists,13 gradually split in two – Serbian versus Montenegrin. That is, as long as
Serbianism was not in direct opposition to Montenegrin-ness the two forms of
individual and collective attachment went largely hand-in-hand. Once the
situation changed, the two found themselves on a collision course. With the
ﬁrst modern mass-scale open clash between Montenegrinhood and Serbdom
in the late 1990s, the population of the state had crossed the nationalising
Rubicon by eradicating most of the previous ambiguity and by attempting to
‘ﬁx’ their ethno-national attachments ‘once and for all’. Although nominally
initiated by the political elites, the conﬂict between Serbianism and Montene-
grin-ness in Montenegro was a direct outcome of the changing geopolitical
environment whereby the union with Serbia was proving politically and
economically dysfunctional, beset by the constant threat of Serbia’s domina-
tion over its ten-times smaller partner and the radically differing regional and
geopolitical interests of the two republics. Serbia’s increasing isolation, its
unwillingness to reform under Milosˇevic´, its war with NATO over Kosovo, its
reluctance to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) even under its democratic government, have all
had detrimental effects on Montenegro’s development and its ambition to join
Euro-Atlantic integrations. In this context, the geopolitical raison d’Etat has
further enhanced the already institutionalised politicisation of culture, thus
directly inﬂuencing the perceptions of the Montenegrin political and cultural
elites and population at large in the direction of favouring an independent
state. To justify independent statehood it became paramount to articulate
political goals in cultural terms and hence to counter Montenegrin-ness and
Serbianism. The staggering change in public opinion on the question of
national self-determination between the two referenda (in 1992 and 2006) is a
result of many factors but most of all the legacy of communist modernity, its
politicisation and institutionalisation of high culture and state-building which
were all underpinned by the dramatic geopolitical transformations of recent
years.
This remarkable social change was also evident in the results of the recent
census. While in the communist era an overwhelming majority of the
population declared themselves as Montenegrins and only a small minority
as Serbs, in 2003 this shifted to a staggering 31.99 per cent Serbs to 43.16 per
cent Montenegrins (SG CG 2004: 54). Once the two nation-building projects
underpinned by the two distinct national ideologies come into direct con-
frontation, the population was forced to opt for one over the other. It is not
only that being a Montenegrin and a Serb now for the ﬁrst time entails a sense
of almost complete mutual exclusion, but it also implies a commitment to
conﬂicting state-building projects. Although the striving for independent
statehood and nation-building are two distinct processes, they are tightly
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linked together. This is not to say that with the 2006 referendum the process of
nation-formation in Montenegro is concluded and that Montenegrin and Serb
identities are now carved in stone. Far from it, it is global and regional
geopolitics, economic development, the infrastructural power of the new state,
and the actions of its political and cultural elites and civil society groups that
will determine in which direction the processes of nation-formation will
unfold.
In summary, prior to communist modernity the collective designations of
Serb/Montenegrin/Slav/Yugoslav/Orthodox, together with their sense of group
attachment, were not in conﬂict with each other, but rather were overlapping,
ambiguous and mutually inclusive forms of group membership. It was the
modernising communist state that provided the institutional channels for the
future crystallisation of these group categories into distinctive forms of
individual and collective attachment. The communist state supplied the
institutional form and structural conditions for the ethno-national mobilisation
of the masses, but it was the change in geopolitics that had the decisive impact
on the content of this mobilisation. Once the geopolitical environment changed
and raison d’Etat took over, the two nationalisms found themselves in open
confrontation. It is these processes that ultimately put an end to any previous
ethno-national ambiguity, making clear who was Serb and who Montenegrin.
The impact of communist modernity on the creation of the national high
culture, and eventually on the nationalisation of the masses, together with
geopolitical changes, tells us a great deal about the structural causes of the
two different nationalist trajectories. However, more exploration is needed
into the form and content of these divergent national attachments. In other
words, what are the current dominant discourses of national identiﬁcation in
Montenegro?
Who are the Montenegrins?
As has already been indicated, the ﬁrst conﬂict over deﬁnitions of Montene-
grin-hood occurred with the ﬁrst wave of intensive institutionalisation of the
Montenegrin state during the latter half of the nineteenth century. This
division acquired symbolic colours in 1918 – Greens versus Whites – which
still paint the political landscape of Montenegrin society today, almost a
hundred years later. Over the course of this period Montenegro has been an
independent Kingdom, a province of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, a Republic
within Socialist Yugoslavia, and a Republic in Milosˇevic´’s remnant of
Yugoslavia. It brieﬂy reappeared in the title of the state entity of Serbia
and Montenegro, and, since the referendum of 21 May 2006, effectively came
full circle when Montenegro was proclaimed an independent state. The results
of the referendum in which 55.5 per cent voted for independence
and 44.5 per cent against clearly illustrated the degree of polarisation between
Montenegrin citizens.
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In this section we will analyse the debate that took place in the wake of the
Referendum, primarily in the mass media where the main protagonists were,
aside from the journalists themselves, the leaders of the main political parties,
prominent intellectuals, and members of the cultural elite. The analysis will
highlight the differences in perceptions within the Montenegrin nation
between the supporters of independence and those who opposed it. We
hope that this analysis will reveal how the deﬁnition of Montenegro as an
independent nation was inﬂuenced by the structural and cultural changes that
characterised the end of the twentieth century in these territories.
Montenegrins as ethnic Serbs
Along with the disappearance of an independent Montenegro from the
political map in 1918, any deﬁnition of the Montenegrins as an authentic
nation disappeared from the public discourse. Monarchist Yugoslav political
and cultural institutions propagated a view according to which Montenegrins
were seen as ethnic Serbs. The 2006 referendum revived this argument.
Anthony Smith (2003: 15) deﬁnes an ethnie or ethnic group as ‘a named
community of shared origin myths, memories and one or more element(s) of
common culture, including an association with a speciﬁc territory’. While we
doubt that the proponents of the above view ever encountered Smith’s
writings, the stream of their argument follows such a deﬁnition. The bloc
that opposed the independence of Montenegro – the No Bloc – deﬁned
Montenegrins on the basis of a common name, history, myths of origin,
culture, religion and territory with the peoples of Serbia and Montenegro.
The most prominent argument aimed at supporting the view that Mon-
tenegrins were ethnically Serb was that of a common name. Peter Vlahovic´
(www.njegos.org/past/Vlahovic.htm) offers some of the clearest examples:
‘Even when they called and declared themselves as Dukljani, and later as
Zecˇani, and ﬁnally as Montenegrins . . . they always had another common
name – Serbs, and declared themselves so.’ Indeed, there is no problem in
ﬁnding historical records that fully support such a claim. Vlahovic´ refers,
among others, to the Charter of King Milutin from the fourteenth century
and to the Monastery of St Nicholas where the people of the region are
described as Latins, Albanians, and as Vlachs. Vladika Danilo (1670–1735)
apparently left a note in which he called himself ‘the prince of the Serbian
land’. Similarly, Bishop Vasilije Petrovic´ (1709–66) signed himself as ‘Serene
metropolitan of Montenegro, Skenderia, the Littoral and of the Serbian
throne’ (ibid.). In 1807, Vladika Petar I Petrovic´ Njegosˇ wrote about how ‘the
leading role in the restoration of the Serb empire belongs to Montenegro’
(ibid.). Petar II Petrovic´ Njegosˇ declared in 1848 that Serbdom had to unite,
and in 1855 Danilo Petrovic´ Njegosˇ proclaimed a code that would come to be
recognised as one of the ﬁrst all-Montenegrin laws known as The Code of
Prince Danilo. In its 92nd paragraph was written: ‘there is no other nationality
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in this land except the Serb nationality and no other religion except Eastern
Orthodoxy’ (www.njegos.org/petrovics/danilo.htm).
Records such as these were uncovered by current daily newspapers and
presented as evidence of a Montenegrin Serb identity. For example, during the
period of 18–20 May 2006, the pro-No Bloc paper Dani printed a series of
articles entitled Historical Lessons in which the letters of King Nikola were
used to demonstrate the national identity of this last Montenegrin king. The
message was emphasised in the title: ‘Serbs in origin, Montenegrins by
territory’.
These references to the writings of Montenegrin rulers can only be seen as
an attempt to establish historical continuity between the Montenegrins of old
times and those of today. If the forefathers declared themselves to be Serbs,
their descendents cannot be anything else. According to this view, history is
not seen as just a set of records – dead letters. History is perceived as a living
thing. It determines the present and shapes the future through the notion of
predecessors. These predecessors are seen as the guardians of Montenegrin
honour, their system of values. The reports of the Dani newspaper frequently
referred to the speeches and statements of those who did not support
Montenegrin independence, political leaders as much as ‘common’ people.
The justiﬁcation for their attitudes was found in their heritage. For example,
in its 18 May 2006 issue, Dani quoted Andrija Mandic´ – leader of the Serbian
People’s Party in Montenegro – who claimed: ‘All who vote other than NO
will embarrass their descendents as well as their predecessors’. In the same
issue the ‘head’ of the family Bogavac from Mojkovacˇki Tutic´i stated: ‘in [this
community’s] foundations bones of my father and other predecessors are built
in and their curse would reach me if I would vote for an independent
Montenegro’. Cˇedomir Janketic´ said: ‘We have always been Serbs and we
will stay Serbs. I would be ashamed in front of my predecessors if I did
differently, and for my descendents I would always be a disgrace.’
Past, present and future are seen here as an organic whole, a link
strengthened not only by nature but by nurture as well. People of one blood,
the brothers, are also of the same religion, the same traditions, and the same
language. The Socialist People’s Party (SNP) reinforced this in a number of its
party resolutions. For example, one entitled ‘The declaration on preservation of
state, spiritual and democratic values’ put forward on 11 November 2005 states:
‘The Serbian language is one of the essential factors of a Montenegrin entity.
Within it our spirituality and history is preserved, and hence, violence against
the Serbian language represents an attack on the highest values of Montenegro’
(www.snp.cg.yu). Similarly, the party’s congress put forward the ‘Resolution on
the [Serbian Orthodox] Church’ (ibid.). The speciﬁc nature of the Orthodox
Church structure merges the issues of religion and nationality. An autocepha-
lous church becomes proof of the existence of a nation. The SNP writes of how
the ‘Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Coastlands [is] spiritually the
highest and historically the most important part of the Serbian Orthodox
Church’ (ibid.). Consequently, through the protection of the de facto Serbian
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Orthodox Church, ‘its spiritual institutions and holy relics, Montenegro will be
sustained in the best possible way, its history and its tradition’.
But even if Montenegrins are Serbs – ethnically and historically, by language
and faith – proponents of these views still have to explain the existence of the
terms Montenegro and Montenegrins. The opponents of Montenegrin inde-
pendence see Montenegro as a territorial region of Serbdom. The notion of
regional difference is balanced with the historical territorial demarcation of the
Montenegrin tribes. Dani of 18 May 2006 printed a report from a gathering of
the tribe Kucˇi in which a political leader claimed: ‘If we follow the reasoning of
the Montenegrin government, which only wants to separate, it could happen
that Kucˇi demands independence from the rest of Montenegro. We would have
a basis for declaration of independence for Kucˇi, our ﬂag would be the one
from the battle of Fundin, and the border with Podgorica would be the cinema
Kultura.’ This example shows how ethnicity is viewed as the basis of national
deﬁnition. Thus if ethnic origins are marginalised, according to this view, there
is no objective foundation to national identiﬁcation. The possibilities of
territorial fragmentation are limitless.
Where then did the idea of Montenegrins as a separate nation originate?
The explanation is found in the attempts at social engineering by communist
Yugoslavia that were apparently undertaken for one reason only: to weaken
the Serbian nation. The most commonly mentioned ‘conspirator’ is Milovan
Ðilas. After all, Dani would claim, it was his decision as a member of the CPY
leadership that enabled the establishment of the Montenegrin Republic within
Socialist Yugoslavia. The institutionalisation of this republic on a political,
cultural and economic level, and the propaganda that followed, were seen as
artiﬁcially creating a new sense of identity that had as its primary aim the
separation of Montenegrins from Serbs.
The proponents of Montenegrin independence rejected such a view. It was
not the socialist revolution that created the Montenegrin nation, but rather
historical evolution.
Montenegrins as a civic nation
If the deﬁnition of Montenegrins as ethnic Serbs resembles that of Smith, the
view according to which Montenegrins are a nation on their own accord
closely resembles the deﬁnition of nationhood proposed by Ernest Gellner
(1983: 7). The daily newspaper Pobjeda (http://www.pobjeda.co.yu) printed
over several issues excerpts from Mijat Sˇukovic´’s book entitled The Constitu-
tion of Montenegrin Principality from 1905. Here Sˇukovic´ explains:
Unlike others, the Montenegrin nation has not formed its state, but, rather, within the
Montenegrin state, through the process of modernization at the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth centuries, the maturation and the ﬁnal conﬁguration of
the Montenegrin nation was achieved (www.pobjeda.co.yu/naslovna.phtml?akcija
=advview&id=78144).
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In the wake of the referendum of 2006, in order to base the Montenegrin
nation on sound ground and challenge any notion of the artiﬁciality
of its origins, proponents of an independent Montenegro undertook
the task of proving the existence of a Montenegrin nation prior to the
establishment of Yugoslavia. Hence the impact of state socialism on the
formation of the Montenegrin nation is conspicuously missing from these
debates. The history of the Montenegrin nation is seen as having been
interrupted by the formation of the so-called First Yugoslavia. Only the re-
establishment of an independent state of Montenegro will restore the ‘natural’
life of the nation.
As Sˇukovic´ explains, the Montenegrin nation at the end of the nineteenth
and the beginning of the twentieth centuries ‘naturally developed its maturity
and was formed on a solid and centuries-long Montenegrin historical-
cultural and historical-political factual basis, in which all, absolutely all,
constituent elements have already existed’ (ibid.). Unlike the opponents of
Montenegrin independence and nationhood, who deﬁne the nation in
exclusively ethnic terms, the proponents of Montenegrin independence see
the state and its institutions as the main factors that initiated the formation of
the Montenegrin nation.
History once again provides adequate support for these views. In this case,
the proponents of Montenegrin independence produced ofﬁcial communica-
tions from the beginning of the twentieth century. Even if generations of
Petrovic´ rulers saw themselves as Serbs, the formation of the Montenegrin
Kingdom reformed the ruler’s mode of identiﬁcation. Sˇukovic´ emphasised how
‘instead of . . . using terms such as ‘‘Serbdom’’, ‘‘Serbian people [narod ]’’,
‘‘interests of Serbdom’’, in ofﬁcial communications with Serbia, other terms
appeared – ‘‘two brotherly people [narodi ] Serbian and Montenegrin’’,
separate ‘‘interests of Montenegro and Montenegrin people’’ ’ (ibid.). The
stress placed by the opponents of Montenegrin independence on historical
continuity forced the Yes Bloc to emphasise signiﬁcant moments of historical
discontinuity. The events of 1918, during which Montenegro became a part of
a unitary Yugoslavia,14 are now regarded as the crucial moment of suppression
of Montenegrin nationhood, seen as having been orchestrated by the Serb-
dominated government. The last and only king of Montenegro, Nikola,
becomes a heroic and tragic character symbolic of Montenegrin suffering. It
now became important to demonstrate Nikola’s Montenegrin identity and his
opposition to uniﬁcation. In May 2006, Pobjeda (http://www.pobjeda.co.yu)
published a series of excerpts from the book Montenegro and Montenegrins in
the New Europe by Branislav Kovacˇevic´ andMarijan-Masˇo Miljic´ in which the
authors examined in detail the events surrounding WWI. They write: ‘Before
the war, king Nikola wanted his own state, independent from Serbia, and his
own crown, independent from Kara:or:evic´’s one’. The sacriﬁces of the
Montenegrin people throughout WWI were, according to this view, ‘rewarded’
by the destruction of the Montenegrin dynasty and its state. ‘The enthrone-
ment of the Petrovic´ dynasty is executed not by voting but by the blood of the
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best elements in Montenegro, those who in spite of the most terrible
temptations defended their honour and freedom, and the freedom and unity
of their people.’ The message was simple: the Kingdom of Montenegro was an
independent state and an expression of Montenegrin nationhood at the
beginning of the twentieth century. The formation of an independent Mon-
tenegro a century later will, again, secure the existence of the Montenegrin
nation.
The argument of the No Bloc, according to which only a minority of
Montenegrin inhabitants declared themselves to be Montenegrins,
was balanced by a noteworthy deﬁnition of nationhood by Sˇukovic´. He
writes:
Nation is an objective category and phenomenon. Its existence does not depend on the
number of people that belong to it. . . . The existence of the Montenegrin nation in that
period is attested by objective facts. . . . They have fully formedMontenegrin historical,
political, cultural, national identity and individuality.
The existence of a nation deﬁned in this way does not depend on identiﬁcation
by its individual members. It exists so long as the ‘spirit’ of the nation exists.
The nation is seen as a metaphysical phenomenon, a ‘spirit’, not a social
group, safeguarded by the state institutions. As a consequence, the essence of
the Montenegrin nation is changeable, not given. Sreten Zekovic´, in an
article entitled Montenegrinhood and Montenegrin Serbdom (www.montene
gro.org.au), exempliﬁed this view when stressing the importance of
‘non-ethnic, supra-ethnic and multi-ethnic’ factors in the formation of
Montenegrin-hood through the course of history. He recognised the inﬂu-
ences of ‘Serbian consciousness and tradition’, especially ‘Serbian Ortho-
doxy’, but also the inﬂuence of the Western European tradition just as that of
Islam. These factors that have affected Montenegrin consciousness through-
out history, he concludes, formed a never-accomplished Montenegrin na-
tional phenomenon.
The deﬁnition of the Montenegrin nation at the beginning of the twenty-
ﬁrst century was clearly a reaction to the view that denied this nation’s
existence. One of the most noticeable characteristics of this deﬁnition was a
clear break with the tradition of deﬁning the nation on these territories.
The dominant ethnic, organic deﬁnition was replaced by a civic deﬁnition
that emphasised the role of the state in the process of nation-building.
The notion of the nation as built from below was replaced by one in
which it is seen as built from above. Such a view is possible only in a situation
where the institution of the state is perceived as national and therefore capable
of disseminating the ‘spirit’ of Montenegrin-hood. The Montenegrin ‘na-
tional-awakeners’ of today deny the role of Socialist Yugoslavia in ‘forging
the Montenegrin nation’. Yet they rely on the structural support of the
Montenegrin state and its cultural, political, and educational institutions,
which were essential in turning the Montenegrin people into a Montenegrin
nation.
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Conclusion
In the context of the complete failure of communist federal structures
worldwide, the delayed independence of Montenegro was and remains an
oddity. While the small size of the state, its questionable economic viability,
its lack of serious political alternatives and its strong cultural and historical
links to Serbia explain an important segment of this puzzle, these factors alone
do not provide the full picture. A more substantial interpretation requires
engagement with a crucial but often neglected issue – the legacy of communist
modernity. While most scholarly accounts, as well as the dominant Mon-
tenegrin nationalist discourse, either ignore or minimise this historical period,
even those interpretations that do highlight the importance of state socialism
in nation-building, such as the Serbian nationalist discourses in Montenegro,
misinterpret its impact. The two divergent trajectories of nation-formation in
Montenegro had little to do with the deliberate social engineering of
communist leaders such as Ðilas and others, but rather were largely an
unintended consequence of intensive state-building, cultural and political
modernisation, and most of all, the gradual politicisation and institutionalisa-
tion of high culture. The communist state provided institutional structures
and organisational mechanisms that helped to reify ethno-national attach-
ments. In this respect, Montenegro was similar to the other republics of
federal Yugoslavia which all, in some aspects, reﬂected the Soviet policy of
nationality. However, what made Montenegro unique was its turbulent
history of numerous territorially based political divides. To circumvent the
deep historical cleavages between the North and South, Greens and Whites,
or traditionalists and modernisers, the communist state was forced to balance
the nationalisation of the masses along the Montenegrin–Serb axis by keeping
the two categories ambiguous and inclusive while integrating them with the
broader Yugoslav identity. Although the collapse of the Yugoslav state
dented this balance, it was only the radical shift in geopolitics during the
late 1990s and early 2000s that pitted Serbian and Montenegrin nationalisms
against each other and proved to be the ﬁnal catalyst for the eventual
independence of Montenegro. Thus Montenegrin nationalism was not a
simple fabrication either of ‘Serbophobic conspirators’ or ‘totalitarian dicta-
torship’. Instead both nationalisms, Montenegrin and Serbian in Montenegro,
were products of the same complex institutional process – communist
modernity.
Thus the answers to the three questions raised in the introduction point in
the same direction. The peculiarity of Montenegro’s nation-formation and the
delayed support for full independence was rooted in the cultural and political
ambiguities of state socialism. The astounding change in popular support for
a sovereign and internationally recognised nation-state emerged only when
this ambiguity was ultimately broken and Serbian and Montenegrin nation-
alisms found themselves on a direct collision course. Finally, these same
processes have helped to institutionalise and mobilise the Montenegrin public
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around the two dominant and opposing discourses of nationhood: the view of
Montenegrins as ethnic Serbs and the notion of a distinct Montenegrin civic
nation. The slight majority won by the pro-independence bloc has secured an
independent state and thus moved the debate away from the question of the
usefulness of the existing union with Serbia. However, the process of nation-
building is far from uniform or complete as the two contradictory under-
standings of ‘Who are the Montenegrins?’ will remain to polarise the
population of Montenegro in the years to come.
Notes
1 We would like to thank the anonymous referees of Nations and Nationalism for their helpful
comments on the earlier draft of this paper.
2 We use terms such as ‘deferred’ or ‘belated’ independence in a purely chronological and
comparative sense without any intention of implying that this particular historical outcome was
inevitable or something that we personally prefer.
3 Out of the inﬂuential political parties that emerged in the early post-communist period, nearly
all of them had direct or indirect links with the communist-era establishment. Even the Liberal
Alliance of Montenegro, which was the only signiﬁcant pro-independence force in the early 1990s,
was headed by a former communist, Slavko Perovic´.
4 Although the historic designation hristiani or hrisˇc´ani (Christians) was vastly ambiguous when
used in the context of a religious in-group (thus often acting as a synonym for Serb, Montenegrin
or a tribal label) it was much less ambiguous when used for the religious Other (i.e. Catholic or
Muslim) when it become a mutually exclusive category of identiﬁcation.
5 According to Rastoder (2003: 110) and Jovanovic´ (1948: 55), the term Montenegro (Crna
Gora, literally ‘Black Mountain’) would become the standard name for the territory of the
mountainous area between the coast and the Zeta River around the end of the ﬁfteenth century
and would be known as Old Montenegro. The north part of the Zeta River was known as the
Brda. Full uniﬁcation of these territories occurred only in the nineteenth century.
6 This view also underestimates the signiﬁcant bifurcations in political life under state socialism.
For a criticism of this perspective see Malesˇevic´ (2006: 158–63).
7 Although we ﬁnd Brubaker’s (1996, 2004, 2006) general institutionalist account highly
convincing we do not subscribe to his cognitivism that attributes too much power to the
‘pervasive system of social classiﬁcation’. Similarly, we draw on Gellner’s modernist emphasis
on the standardised high culture, universal literacy, and education systems while dissenting from
his explanatory economism. Furthermore, unlike these two authors, we stress the importance of
geopolitical factors in the development and articulation of distinct nationalist movements and
ideologies.
8 For a cogent analysis of the importance of Orthodox Christianity in the formation of
nationalisms in the Balkans see Roudometof (2001).
9 On the nature of Yugoslav federalism see Ramet (1992) and Malesˇevic´ (2006: 157–84).
10 For a representative writing that expresses an ofﬁcial party line on nationalism in Montenegro
which also reproduces this ambiguous attitude see Spadijer (1986).
11 As in the 1961 census the category ‘Muslim’ was not listed as distinct nationality, most
Muslims of Montenegro declared themselves as Montenegrins.
12 On the unprecedented intensity of this conﬂict in Montenegro, see Banac 1988.
13 In 1997 the ruling DPS split into two political parties, led by two former leaders of the ‘anti-
bureaucratic revolution’ in Montenegro – the DPS led by M. Ðukanovic´ and the SNP led by
M. Bulatovic´.
14 Actually, in 1918 the ofﬁcial title of the state was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,
and it became Yugoslavia only in 1929.
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